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BANKRUPTCY'S HOME ECONOMICS
DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
There's a wonderful passage in the New Testament where Jesus finds his
disciples debating which one of them would be the greatest in the kingdom of
heaven. "'What were you discussing on the way?,"' Jesus asks, as Saint Mark
records the incident. "But they kept silent, for on the way they had argued with one
another about who was the greatest. And he sat down and called the twelve ....
And he took a child and put him in the midst of them, and taking him in his arms,
he said to them, 'Whoever receives one such child in my name receives me, and
whoever receives me, receives not me but him who sent me." t
I love the passage for many reasons, but one reason is the timeless
psychological truth: It's so hard to resist the temptation to debate our relative
importance. The conference for which the articles in this symposium were prepared
was, in fact, almost tailor-made for a spirited game of one-upmanship. Nearly all of
the finest bankruptcy scholars in the country, as well as several leading lawyers and
bankruptcy judges, gathered in a single law school classroom to discuss and debate
the legacy of the reforms that ushered in a new era in American bankruptcy law
twenty-five years ago. I am pleased to report there was very little discussion-
none, indeed, that I was aware of--of who is the best or the most important
bankruptcy scholar of this generation during the course of the conference.
But if we let down our guards and did have such a conversation, when it comes
to personal bankruptcy, I think there would be something like unanimous agreement
that Elizabeth Warren has been the nation's leading consumer bankruptcy scholar
over the last ten or twenty years. By whatever yardstick we might choose-
scholarly productivity, institutional leadership, prominence in the media-Professor
Warren stands alone at the top of the list.
2
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. These comments are substantially as delivered at the
American Bankruptcy Institute's 25th Anniversary Symposium of the Bankruptcy Code on October 10,
2003. I have revised the remarks somewhat, but have preserved the structure and tone of the original
comments. I am grateful to Ray Warner for inviting me to participate in the symposium, to Ronald Mann,
Bruce Markell, Bob Rasmussen, Elizabeth Warren, and Amy Wax for very helpful comments and
suggestions, and to Sam Gerdano and the American Bankruptcy Institute for making the symposium
possible.
1 Mark 9:33-37 (English Standard Version). The incident is also recounted in Matthew 18:1-5 and Luke
9:46-48.
2 1 have discussed Professor Warren's prominence in the scholarly literature in detail elsewhere. David A.
Skeel, Jr., Vern Countryman and the Path of Progressive (and Populist) Bankruptcy Scholarship, 113 HARV.
L. REv. 1075, 1078 (2000) (characterizing Warren as the principal successor to William Douglas and Vein
Countryman). Warren was also the chief advisor to the 1994 Bankruptcy Review Commission, the last major
study of America's bankruptcy laws. In the extensive press coverage of the major package of proposed
bankruptcy reforms that has been debated in Congress for the past seven years, Warren has figured far more
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So it was a particular honor for me to be invited to comment on The New
Economics of the American Family, which, as Professor Warren notes, is drawn in
many respects from her recent co-authored book, The Two Income Trap.3 In the
comments that follow, I will refer to both, though I will put particular emphasis on
the article. I'll start by briefly describing the basic thesis of the article-that today's
two-income families are actually worse off financially than their single-income
counterparts of a generation ago--and by assessing both its power and its potential
limits. I'll then turn to Professor Warren's proposals for responding to the most
obvious causes of the financial predicament that so many American families find
themselves in. I'll conclude by exploring several of the myths and morals of
bankruptcy, and by outlining several of my own candidates for reform.
I. CAUGHT IN THE Two-INCOME TRAP
When large numbers of women started entering the-workforce in the 1970s, it
was widely, assumed that the new two income families would have it made. And
this in many respects has remained the conventional wisdom. "They may be
stressed," as Warren puts it, "they may feel guilty about sending their kids to day
care, and they may have too little time for each other, but the one piece of good
news the family can count on is that they are more financially secure.",
4
In The New Economics of the American Family, Warren shows that, for many
families, this assumption of enhanced financial security is an illusion. Based on a
simple hypothetical comparison between a single income family from 1973 and
their 2000 two income counterpart, both of whom have two children, Warren
demonstrates that the two income family is actually worse off financially.5 True, the
two-income family earns substantially more-75% more than the old one income
family ($67,800 vs. $39,000, when both figures are reported in 2000 dollars). But
the cost of housing, daycare (which single-income families didn't need but dual
wage earners do), and healthcare has increased so much in the past thirty years that
it wipes out the increased earnings and then some. An average 1973 family spent
$5,310 a year in mortgage payments; $1,030 for health insurance; $5,140 for the
payments, insurance and upkeep on one car; and roughly 24% of their income for
taxes. Add all of this up, and the 1973 couple had $17,834 left over for everything
else they needed.
prominently than any other legal academic. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, The Press and Complex
Legislation: A Bankruptcy Reform Case Study (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
3 Elizabeth Warren, The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter The New Economics]; ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGi, THE Two-INCOME
TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (Basic Books 2003) [hereinafter
TI-TRAP].
4 The New Economics, supra note 3, at 3.
5 The details described in this paragraph and the next can be found in The New Economics, supra note 3, at
16-18. In the book, the 1973 couple is referred to as Tom and Susan, and the'2000 couple as Justin and
Kimberly. TI-TRAP, supra note 3, at 50-52.
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A 2000 couple who starts off with $67,000 in income can expect to pay nearly
$9,000 in mortgage payments; $1,650 for health insurance; and slightly over $8,000
for the two cars they now need. The 2000 couple also needs more help with
childcare, which adds $4,350 for after school and summer day care for their older
child and $5,320 for their younger child's preschool; and they can expect to fork
over 33% of their income to the government in taxes. Once all of these obligations
are deducted, the 2000 couple isn't rolling in the dough at all. They have only
$17,045 left over for food, clothing and other expenses-$800 less than their single-
income counterparts of the early 1970s.
Ironically, the increasing number of two income families has contributed to the
very financial problems that it was expected to solve. As two income families
search for homes in safe neighborhoods with good schools for their kids, they bring
their extra income to the table, which has helped to bid up housing costs in the most
desirable neighborhoods.
6
The data are depressing, but it gets even worse. In the most important insight of
the article (and book), Warren points out that today's two-income families are
actually more vulnerable-not just equally vulnerable but more vulnerable-to
financial failure than their 1970s one income counterparts. In the one income
family, the wife served as a back-up wage earner. If the husband lost his job or was
side-lined by injury or illness, the wife could temporarily enter the workforce.' The
jobs that were available weren't glamorous, but they could often replace enough of
the husband's income (roughly 25%, on average) to help the family make ends meet
until the husband returned to the workforce. Two-income families don't have this
insurance policy. And with two jobs that can be lost, rather than just one, they face
almost twice the risk of a job loss that could lead to financial ruin.8 If the couple
divorces-as nearly half do-the picture is bleaker still. Divorce ratchets up
expenses (starting with the cost of the apartment or house the departing spouse
moves into) but doesn't add anything to the family income.9
This is a powerful story, and it resonates deeply with many Americans. When I
showed a draft of my comments to a friend, his reaction was-like Charlie Brown
in the famous Christmas special, who finally recognizes his phobia after Lucy runs
through a long list-"That's it!" His wife is a doctor and he's a medical resident, yet
they and their two young children barely scrape by each month. The "two-income"
6 Economists refer to this pattern of working even harder, yet not seeming to get ahead, because others are
competing for the same goods, as an "arms race" or "rat race." See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, LUxURY
FEVER: MONEY AND HAPPINESS IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (Princeton University Press 1999).
7 The New Economics, supra note 3, at 4 (describing wife's role as the "ultimate insurance against
unemployment or disability" by providing additional source of income in event of emergency); TI-TRAP,
suera note 3, at 59-60.
The New Economics, supra note 3, at 21 (discussing internal risks associated with two-income
households).
9 Id. at 27 (stating high divorce, cancer, heart attack rates are surpassed by higher bankruptcy rates).
2004]
ABILA WREVIEW
trap provides an explanation for the struggles that they like numerous other families
encounter in their daily financial lives.10
The same era as the run-up in major living expenses chronicled by Warren has
also seen an astonishing increase in bankruptcy filings, from slightly under 200,000
in 1979, the year the Bankruptcy Code became effective, to 1.1 million in 1996.1
This past year set yet another record, with over 1.6 million new bankruptcy
petitions. There obviously is some connection between the financial straits many
two-income families find themselves in and the surge of activity in the bankruptcy
courts. The question I would like to ask, as a way to put Professor Warren's
analysis of the new economics of the American family into perspective, is this: How
much of the bankruptcy wave can be attributed to the two-income trap?
One difficulty we encounter if we try to figure out how many Justin and
Kimberlies are out-there is definitional. Warren distinguishes between two kinds of
families, those with two-incomes and those with a single breadwinner. One thing
the data do not tell us is how many of the two-income families have two truly full-
time incomes, as opposed to one full-time income and one supplemental or
occasional salary. A family with one full-time salary, and a spouse who works two
days a week in a dentist's office or as a retail sales clerk is quite different from the
family with two full-time jobs.
It also would be useful to break down the category of unmarried women with
children into those who were married but subsequently divorced, on the one hand,
and those who never tied the knot in the first instance. If the children's mother and
father both have jobs, their sundered families would qualify as two-income families
in each instance, but they raise very different issues. The financial track record of
never married mothers and their children has always been dreary, both before and
after the financial changes that have taken place over the past generation.12 It is the
once-married mothers whose travails are most accurately attributed to the two-
income squeeze. To be sure, these categories are blurrier than they once were:
Marriage is a less accurate proxy for an initially intact family than it was in the
10 So deeply does the analysis resonate that it made its way into the speeches of several of the candidates
for the Democratic presidential nomination. In an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal in late 2003, for instance,
Howard Dean worried that the "average American family is in trouble," and cited THE Two-INCOME TRAP's
finding that "today's two-income families earn 75% more money than their single-income counterparts did a
generation ago, but they actually have less money to spend." Howard Dean, We Can Do Better, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 22, 2003, at A8.
'For a table of the non-business filings from 1978-1998, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A
HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 188 (Princeton University Press 2001) [hereinafter DEBT'S
DOMINION].
12 E.g., Peter M. Cicchino, The Problem Child: An Empirical Survey and Rhetorical Analysis of Child
Poverty in the United States, 5 J.L. & POL'Y 5, 38 (1996) (estimating "almost nine out of ten children who
live with unmarried single mothers live in poverty."); Deborah L. Rhode, Politics and Pregnancy:
Adolescent Mothers and Public Policy, I S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 99, 116-17 (1992) (finding
adolescent single mothers suffer severe financial hardships).
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past. 13 But there still are broad differences between these two categories of
families. 14
Now, developing data for each of these categories of families would no doubt
prove quite difficult and possibly unrealistic. 15 But my guess is that the number of
families in bankruptcy that fit squarely within the two-income paradigm would be
substantially smaller than first meets the eye.
The housing data raise somewhat similar questions. Central to the two-income
trap story is the plight of middle class families who extend themselves so that they
can live in the right zip code, the zip code with safe neighborhoods and good
schools for their kids. "With extra income from Mom's paycheck and extra
mortgage money from the bank," as Warren puts it, "the usual supply and demand
in the market for homes in desirable areas exploded into an all-out bidding war."
'16
Although mortgage costs clearly are a major issue for many families, Warren's data
suggest that the proportion of bankruptcy debtors who have houses is roughly half.
For the half who does not own houses, this aspect of the two-income trap isn't as
obvious a piece of the puzzle.
The explosion of bankruptcy filings has been the subject of endless debate ever
since it began, which is a sure sign that there's no simple explanation for the trend.
1 7
My own view is that changes in the structure of the consumer credit market have
played an enormous role in the increase even apart from dynamics of the two-
income trap. Although credit cards date back fifty years (starting with a card that
was limited to 27 New York restaurants), the now-ubiquitous black magnetic strip
didn't appear until the early 1970s.18 The magnetic strip was one indication of the
dramatic technological change afoot, as computers made it easier than ever before
to track consumers' finances and to process transactions. Credit card companies
also got a helping hand from a 1978 Supreme Court decision-Marquette National
Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp. ' 9-which essentially deregulated interest
rates by holding that any restrictions would be determined by the state of domicile
of the credit card company, rather than the location of the consumer. To escape the
tough interest ceilings in place in some states, all the credit card companies had to
13 For a criticism of the emphasis on the family as the natural social unit, see, for example, Martha L.A.
Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181 (1995).
14 Rather than the blended rate of the 21.3 bankruptcy filings per 1,000 unmarried women with children (as
compared to 14.7 for couples with children and 7.3 for couples without children), The New Economics,
supra note 3, 26 n.78, for instance, it would be useful to see separate filing rates for once married and never
married women with children.
" The principal source of data outside of bankruptcy is the U.S. census, for instance, and census data do
not provide these more fine-grained categories.
TI-TRAP, supra note 3, at 32.
17 Nor is the controversy new. There is a long history of hand-wringing over increases in bankruptcy
filings. See, e.g., DEBT'S DOMINION, supra note 11, at 136 (describing similar concern about bankruptcy
increase in early 1960s).
18 For good histories of credit cards, see generally DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING
WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING (The MIT Press 1999) and LEWIS
MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY (Twayne Publishers 1990).
19 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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do is set up shop in a state-such as Delaware or South Dakota-that went easy on
the restrictions.
In the past two decades, the entire consumer credit relationship has changed.
Credit card companies have become increasingly promiscuous in their lending,
often conducting only a cursory credit check of the consumers who respond to their
pre-approved credit card solicitations. Consumers, for their part, don't look at their
obligations in quite the same way as they did when obtaining credit meant a face-to-
face meeting with a bank or credit union loan officer. There's more credit than ever
before-much of it extended to consumers who would never have qualified for a
bank loan in the past-and the creditor is a voice mail system and an address on an
envelope, rather than a real human being.2°
My point is simply that it is important to keep the significance of the squeeze on
two-income families in perspective. As Warren's analysis makes clear, 21 the two-
income trap is only part-a startling and important part, but only a part-of a much
larger story.
II. REINING IN A MARKETPLACE GONE AMOK
Although I've argued that the two-income trap is only part of the reason for the
explosion of bankruptcy filings, it clearly is a major concern for many American
families. What can be done to address the problem?
In the article, Warren offers (or hints at) three major proposals for reform. Her
first proposal is to remove the special treatment that home mortgages are given in
bankruptcy. Second, and related, is a proposal that Congress overturn the
Marquette decision, so that it or the states could reintroduce meaningful usury
regulation. Third, Warren suggests that Congress should consider providing much
greater insurance against disability than currently is the case. As I have listed them,
the proposals move from most to least directly related to bankruptcy, and from most
to least politically plausible. In addition to these three, I'll also briefly consider a
proposal for universal school vouchers that Warren makes in the book.
A. Reversing the Special Treatment for Home Mortgages
Under the 1978 Code, home mortgages are given something close to
untouchable status. Although a home mortgage can be cured and reinstated if a
debtor files for chapter 13, the mortgage can't be stripped down to the value of the
20 For discussion of the extent to which credit card lending has moved down the economic ladder, see, for
example, David A. Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or
Both?, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 332-46 (1999).
21 This is especially true in the book, which devotes a chapter to the explosion of credit card and mortgage
debt. TI-TRAP, supra note 3, at 123-62.
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house that secures it. 2 The lender must be paid in full. Mortgages are similarly
sacrosanct if the debtor files for chapter 7.23
"At the time the 1978 Code was adopted," Warren writes, "such deference may
have been entirely appropriate. After all, mortgage lending was stable, long-term
lending, with interest rates pegged only modestly above anticipated inflation."
24
Mortgage lenders warned, moreover, that they would be forced to raise rates or cut
off credit if homeowners who defaulted could use bankruptcy to strip down the
amount of their repayment obligation to the value of the property. The world has
changed since 1978, Warren argues. Mortgage obligations are now "a significant
part of the middle class family's financial woes," due to the rising cost of housing;
2 5
and the advent of the subprime lending market has brought second and third
mortgages, dubious fees and sky-high interest rates. For both of these reasons,
Warren questions why home mortgages should be treated any differently from
credit cards or other loans in bankruptcy.
Now, an obvious danger is that permitting debtors to strip down their mortgages
and at the same time keep their houses would exacerbate the two-income trap rather
than alleviating it. If lenders did indeed raise their interest rates, cut back on credit,
or perhaps insist on higher downpayments, in response to the increased
vulnerability of their mortgages, things could get even worse for some families.
26
Hardest hit would be lower or lower-middle class families, the ones who already
have less access to mortgage credit.
My own view is that this is a risk worth taking. Reputable lenders that finance
a family's initial home purchase are less likely to be affected than the lenders who
peddle second and third mortgages, often with loan-to-value ratios that significantly
exceed the actual value of the borrower's house. As Warren suggests, these loans
are quite far afield of the home mortgages that Congress agreed to protect in 1978.7
Some bankruptcy courts have in fact already started chipping away at the special
mortgage protections as they apply to second mortgages. If the debtor's property is
completely encumbered by a higher priority mortgage, a few courts have permitted
22 Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits a debtor's chapter 13 plan from impairing the
rights of a mortgage that is "secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2002).
23 Cf 11 U.S.C. § 722. That section of the Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor to redeem personal
property by paying the current value of the property, but it does not apply to real estate.
24See The New Economics, supra note 3, at 32 (addressing special treatment of mortgage lenders under
Bankruptcy Code).
25 Id. at 33 (demonstrating mortgage debt severely affects middle-income families by subtracting funds
away from everyday necessities).
26 As discussed in the next section, the empirical data on interest rate restrictions suggest that intervention
can have each of these effects. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. One might expect strip down,
which decreases lenders' expected payout if they are undercollateralized, to prompt similar responses.
27 See The New Economics, supra note 3, at 33 (suggesting that the protections for mortgagees predate and
do not account for home mortgage lending's recent evolution). The Supreme Court could have sharply
curtailed the mortgage protection in Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993), but it rejected
the statutory interpretation that would have permitted the lender's mortgage to be stripped down.
2004]
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the borrower to eliminate the second mortgage, based on the view that it's really no
different than an unsecured claim.28
The proposal to eliminate the special status for home mortgages would generate
fierce opposition from mortgage lenders, who have shown themselves quite adept at
bringing lawmakers around to their way of thinking. (I suggested at the outset that
this is the most politically plausible of the proposals, but that certainly doesn't mean
it would be an easy sell). If lawmakers wanted to defuse some of the opposition,
there's an easy way to do it: Simply exclude first mortgages from the reform. If the
existing protection were retained for first mortgages, and jettisoned only first
second and third mortgages, prime mortgage lenders might call off their troops,
leaving only the subprime lenders (and lenders who offer both prime and subprime
mortgages) to battle the reform. But this more limited reform would leave a very
large loophole: it wouldn't apply to mortgages that are repeatedly refinanced or
have extremely high loan to value ratios-and thus smell like a second or third
mortgage-but are the only mortgage on the property. A more nuanced strategy
might be to protect only the mortgages of lenders who supply the purchase money
for the debtor's house, together with mortgages that refinance the original mortgage
and do not increase its balance by more than the costs of the refinancing.29
In short, there would be a cost to eliminating the special status of home
mortgages, but I personally am persuaded that the cost would be worth bearing.
B. Reintroducing Usury Regulation
Next up is Warren's proposal to reintroduce meaningful usury regulation.
"Federal law could be amended to close the loopholes that let one state override the
lending rules of another," she argues-that is, to reverse the effect of the Marquette
decision. "Alternatively, Congress could impose a uniform rate to apply across the
country."
30
Stiffer usury regulation raises somewhat similar questions as the ones we have
just seen, as well as several additional concerns. As with eliminating special
treatment for mortgages, the most obvious concern with usury restrictions is that it's
not clear whether they would make consumers better or worse off.31 To answer this
28 See, e.g., Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (1lth Cir. 2000)
(adopting majority position to "strip off' debtor's junior mortgage as 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(2) protects "only
undersecured, and not wholly unsecured, homestead lenders" and "[e]xtending section 1322(b)(2)'s
protection to wholly unsecured junior mortgages would enlarge the rights afforded to those lenders when the
mortgagors are forced to file a Chapter 13 petition ....").
29 My thanks to Ronald Mann for suggesting this approach.
30 The New Economics, supra note 3, at 38 (noting "[s]uch a provision would enable the states or the
federal government to reimpose meaningful limits on interest rates.").
31 Surveying existing evidence on interest rate restrictions, a recent article concludes that "usury limits
disproportionately hurt the poor" because when "usury limits become binding, lenders ration credit by
requiring higher down payments, increasing loan fees, shortening loan maturities, and restricting the size of
loans." Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, -A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1313 (2002).
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question, I think it would be helpful for Warren to develop a more precise
explanation for why the restrictions are necessary. At some points, she seems to
suggest that the problem is fraudulent behavior by lenders, as when Citibank's
subprime lending subsidiary was accused of deceptively "steer[ing] families to
higher-cost loans whenever they thought they could get away with it."32 Elsewhere,
Warren worries that lenders are making loans to marginal customers who aren't
likely to be able to repay even a properly priced loan. 3 If the problem is fraud,
targeting it directly might make more sense than an across-the-board solution like
usury restrictions, since usury laws can reduce access to credit even for consumers
who aren't likely to be duped.
Building on the work of a variety of other scholars, including Warren herself,
Oren Bar-Gill has recently suggested yet another diagnosis. 34 Bar-Gill argues that
the high cost of credit cards don't stem from fraud but aren't simply risk-appropriate
interest rates either. Drawing on the economic notion of "hyperbolic discounting,"
Bar-Gill argues that many consumers focus much more on the short-term costs and
benefits of credit cards than on their long-term costs. As a result, consumers are
very sensitive to the initial interest rate; but they blithely ignore the late fees and
high interest rate they will incur for carrying a balance.35 According to Bar-Gill, this
behavioral tendency gives credit card companies an incentive to offer extremely
low initial rates, and punitively high subsequent rates. The pricing disparity will
persist even if credit card companies compete vigorously with one another. Indeed,
if a credit card company bucked the trend by increasing its initial rates and reducing
the costs for those who carry a balance, it would quickly lose out to companies that
offered low initial rates.
36
There are some difficulties with Bar-Gill's account, 37 but it has a great deal of
intuitive appeal-it makes sense, for instance, of the odd structure of credit card
(and subprime mortgage) pricing. Like the concern that high risk borrowers can't
handle the high rates, and that this is what's landing many of them in bankruptcy,
the underestimation problem can't be solved by anti-fraud measures, since it doesn't
involve fraud. If either of these concerns is the real problem, it can be seen as
justifying ceilings on permissible interest rates.
32 The New Economics, supra note 3, at 36 (recounting Citibank subsidiary's 2002 scandal concerning
deceptive subprime lending, which led to prosecution and $240 million settlement).
33 See, e.g., id. at 39 (arguing that if usury restrictions were imposed, lenders "would no longer be allowed
to charge exorbitant interest rates to families with marginal credit records, it would become unprofitable for
lenders to pursue families in financial trouble").
34 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
35 See, e.g., id. at 37 ("The hyperbolic discounting phenomenon, which accounts for the underestimation of
future borrowing, also explains consumers' underestimation of the repayment period.").
36 Id. at 4 ("[I]f the credit card market is indeed as competitive as it appears to be, issuers have to exploit
consumers' imperfect rationality in order to survive in this market.").
3' The analysis doesn't explain, for instance, why consumers don't stop borrowing after the first month that
they are able to pay their credit card bill in full. It also doesn't fully address the intuition that borrowers focus




But we need to be careful to count the potential costs of these kinds of
restrictions. If the usury ceiling is set too low-or becomes too low due to
inflation-many marginally risky consumers will simply be cut off from standard
forms of credit. Like other advocates of interest rate ceilings, Warren corrects for
this risk to some extent by proposing that the interest rate ceiling be tied to a
measure such as the treasury bill rate that moves up and down with inflation.
38
Using a float rate solves one problem-the risk of changing interest rate
conditions-but there still remains the very serious risk that a low baseline rate will
jeopardize many consumers' access to credit.
Access to legitimate credit, at least. Consumers who are cut off from legitimate
credit may seek out alternative forms of credit. The most likely alternative for those
who are unable to obtain a credit card or other credit is pawn shops-some of which
are legitimate, but others of which are more nefarious. Other consumers may turn
to more dubious sources of credit, such as loan sharks. 39 Not only are these
alternative forms of credit likely to have a much higher effective interest rate than
credit card debt, but these aren't the kinds of obligations that can easily -be
discharged by filing for bankruptcy if the consumer gets in over her head.
This leaves us with two questions. The first is whether the need to take arms
against the excesses of the current credit market is strong enough to justify taking
the risk that usury restrictions would backfire. The second is whether there might
be a less intrusive solution than stringent usury restrictions. It may be that
aggressive disclosure obligations like the warnings that cigarette and liquor
advertisements are subject to would alert consumers' to the real costs of their credit.
One can imagine other new disclosure strategies as well. If disclosure were
required not only in the consumer's monthly bill, but also at the point of sale,
consumers would be less likely to incur penalties for accidentally exceeding their
credit limits. 40 But disclosure may not be enough. My own view is that reversing
Marquette in order to let each state regulate interest rates on consumer credit for its
38 See The New Economics supra note 3, at 39 (indicating tying interest rate to inflation rate or treasury
rate will protect consumers regardless of inflation rate). For a detailed analysis of the floating rate approach,
see, Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal Controls on Credit Card Interest
Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 41-42 (1996) (noting difficulties of selecting best spread between benchmark
rate and usury ceiling and concluding "a floating cap on .interest rates is probably the best way to set a
maximum rate.").
39 A prominent historian of consumer finance notes that "pressure from loan sharks to preserve the status
quo" was one reason that strict usury laws lasted so much longer in the U.S. than in most European countries
and "illegal lenders resisted reform of the usury laws.. .because they rightly recognized that no state was
willing to sanction the rates they needed to stay in business." LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN
DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT (Princeton University Press 1999). For a fascinating
account of current fringe banking operations, see JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING
OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR (Russell Sage Foundation 1994). For evidence that lack of access to
legitimate credit leads to use of costly, illegal and dangerous forms of credit in Japan, see Ronald J. Mann,
Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1055 (2002).
40 Ronald Mann argues for point-of-sale disclosure in an extensive new study of credit cards. Ronald J.




consumers might make sense, but that the significant risk that usury regulation will
backfire counsels against a federal usury regulation. Whatever one ultimately
concludes, it is important to identify the problem as precisely as possible; to tailor
any intervention to that particular problem; and to recognize the potential
downsides of credit regulation.
C. Disability Insurance and Universal School Vouchers
The final two proposals are for disability insurance and universal school
vouchers. "Each year," Warren argues, "as many as 300,000 families are driven
into bankruptcy when they lose time from work because of a medical problem.."
41
The existing disability system offers inadequate protection, she argues, because it is
aimed at those who will be out of work for at least a year. Given the link between
health care problems and financial failure, "the expansion of disability insurance to
aid all workers who are struck with a serious disease should be on the national
agenda. ,42
Warren's argument strikes me as compelling, at least in the abstract, and she has
elaborated on the connection between healthcare problems and bankruptcy
elsewhere. (Most strikingly, she and two co-authors show that a large percentage of
the consumers who cite health-related expenses as a reason they filed for
bankruptcy actually have healthcare insurance-it's just that the insurance often
doesn't cover problems like the job disruption caused by an injury or illness).43 The
principal obstacle is cost. The cost of financing disability benefits with public
money would be staggeringly high. 44 In the current political environment, in the
wake of the contentious recent battle over Medicare drug benefits and the earlier
failure of the Clinton administration's national healthcare proposal, it is hard to
imagine a proposal for disability benefits getting off the ground in Washington.
The last proposal calls for universal school vouchers.45 If the voucher proposal
were adopted, every student would be given a full voucher that could be used at any
"public school in a locale, with no presumptive assignment based on
neighborhood., 46 Under this approach, "parents not bureaucrats, would have the
power to pick schools for their children-and to choose which schools would get
41 The New Economics, supra note 3, at 38.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
43 See Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care Financing: Evidence From the
Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 377 (2001) (noting that basic health insurance is inadequate to
shield those suffering serious medical problems from financial devastation).
44 Cost is also a significant obstacle to employers' willingness or ability to provide disability insurance
along with basic health insurance, and it also prevents most families from paying for disability insurance
themselves.
45 Warren proposes universal school vouchers in the book but not the article. TI-TRAP, supra note 3, at 35-
37/. 1 raise it here because it underscores some of the difficulties of addressing the two-income trap. Warren
also makes a variety of other proposals (such as publicly funded pre-school) in the book.
46 TI-TRAP, supra note 3, at 35.
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their children's vouchers., 47 The idea is that, if the link between a student's address
and the public school she attends were severed, parents wouldn't need to compete to
buy houses in the best school districts. Zip code would no longer be destiny,
housing prices would cool off, and many families' mortgage bills would be lowered.
This is a wonderfully clever and intriguing proposal, but it would face the same
obstacles as disability insurance: money and politics. In theory, universal vouchers
needn't increase the cost of public school funding, since the vouchers would simply
replace the existing financing structure. In reality, however, if the vouchers were
designed to give every student enough money to go to a top-notch public school, the
program would require substantially more funding than public schools currently
provide. 48 Even more daunting are the political obstacles. Universal vouchers
would transform the public school system, and the public school bureaucracy would
fight it with every weapon in their formidable arsenal. Indeed, one can imagine
opposition both from conservatives (who would recoil at the prospect of higher
spending on public schools) and liberals (who might resist the more market-oriented
approach to public education).
Unlike with disability insurance, there also is a question whether universal
vouchers would work. People like to live near other people like themselves, and
there is a very good chance that they would continue to compete for houses in safe
neighborhoods even if their children's schools were determined by voucher rather
than zip code. The vouchers might not cool off housing prices nearly as much as
we might like. It may even be that putting more money into the goal of making
neighborhoods safe would be a more effective investment of public funds to
respond to the competition for houses in the most favored neighborhoods.
To conclude my comments on Professor Warren's proposed reforms, let me
make a somewhat different observation about their significance. Suppose Congress
enacted a national healthcare reform that provided disability insurance and perhaps
threw in universal school vouchers to boot. If these reforms were enacted and
proved effective, it would be much less necessary to provide generous bankruptcy
protection as well. Our generous bankruptcy discharge can be seen as a substitute
for the extensive middle class social welfare protections one sees in Europe. If we
provided a broad middle class safety net, the middle class wouldn't be nearly so
fragile, and the universal discharge wouldn't be nearly so essential. This is one
more consideration we need to keep in mind as we debate different responses to the
squeeze that so many families find themselves in.
47 Id.
48 This is of course a damning statement about current educational funding, which remains wildly
inconsistent even after decades of school litigation challenging the disparities between wealthy school
districts and poorer ones.
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III. THE MYTHS AND MORALS OF BANKRUPTCY
Let me conclude by turning to the families themselves. What responsibility, if
any, should they bear for the difficult straits many find themselves in?
Professor Warren makes a powerful case in The New Economics of the
American Family--and in even more detail in The Two-Income Trap-that the
myths of lavish debtors who run up credit to live the high life, and of immoral
debtors who have no qualms whatsoever about filing for bankruptcy, are
significantly overstated. Warren notes, in response to a Newsweek article that
identified "[firivolous shopping"--our preoccupation with "Tommy, Ralph, Gucci,
and Prada"-as a major source of Americans' financial woes-that the "average
family of four today spends 21 percent less (inflation adjusted) on clothing than a
similar family did in the early 1970s. '4 9 Americans do eat out a lot more than their
Brady Bunch era counterparts, but they also spend much less at the grocery store.
As a result, the average family's total food bill is actually 22% percent less than it
50was thirty years ago.
Professor Warren also takes aim at the "myth of the immoral debtor"-the
common view that consumers file for bankruptcy at the first sign of trouble, and
that the stigma of bankruptcy has disappeared.5' Today's bankrupts, she argues, are
in substantially more financial trouble than the bankrupts of thirty years ago. Nor is
there any evidence that the bankruptcy courts are full of fraudulent debtors who are
hiding their assets from creditors, as critics sometime suggest. s2 The debtors we
meet are far more likely to have been derailed by a layoff or job interruption, a
divorce, a healthcare crisis, or a combination of these factors.
What we don't hear as much about, however, are the debtors who muddle
through, who encounter financial distress and somehow manage to pay all of their
creditors and get back on their feet. Long before he took his "show-me" state
attitude to the White House and posted a placard announcing that "the buck stops
here" on his desk, Harry Truman watched an initially successful haberdashery store
sink into financial failure. Although Truman was saddled with substantial debts, he
refused to file for bankruptcy. He insisted on repaying all of his and the stores'
creditors. Eventually he did.
53
49 TI-TRAP, supra note 3, at 17.
'0 d. at 18.
5' Id. at 77. Todd Zywicki has written in most detail about these concerns. Todd J. Zywicki, Why So Many
Bankruptcies and What to Do About It: An Institutional and Transaction Cost Analysis of Bankruptcy Law
and Bankruptcy Reform (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). As suggested earlier, I am
more persuaded than Professor Warren that declining bankruptcy stigma, due in no small part to the changed
nature of the consumer credit relationship, is in fact one of the reasons for the stratospheric number of
bankruptcy filings. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
STI-TRAP, supra note 3, at 78-79.
13 DAVID G. MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 151 (Simon & Schuster 1992). It appears that Truman himself may
have had a bit more help than many of the rest of us do, in that creditors were precluded from garnishing his
wages while he served as a county judge in Missouri.
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A great deal has changed in the decades since Truman's era, of course, but it
seems to me that we need to emphasize this kind of behavior, even in a world where
credit comes in the mail rather than through a face to face meeting with another
human being.
So, what might we do differently if we conclude that the bankruptcy system
should provide a generous discharge for Americans who get caught in the financial
squeeze that Warren so powerfully demonstrates, but that we should also be careful
not to undermine the virtues of fiscal discipline and perseverance? In my view,
there is a strong case for a bankruptcy law that requires debtors to repay some of
what they owe if they can, and gives them a blanket discharge only if they can't.
This doesn't mean that the consumer provisions of the much-debated recent
bankruptcy reform proposals are a good thing. They aren't. Although the ostensible
justification for the proposed reforms is quite similar to the argument I have just
made, the proposed legislation is difficult to defend. Its principal effect would
simply be to increase the cost of filing for bankruptcy, which would discourage
many debtors who genuinely need a discharge from filing.
5 4
There are a variety of ways one could combine a generous discharge with the
expectation that debtors who are capable of repaying should be expected to do so.
The most sensible solution would be to combine chapter 7 and chapter 13 into a
single chapter that imposed a simple repayment obligation-say, 10% of the
debtor's net income for the three years after bankruptcyf5 Chapter 13 has never
worked as expected-its use is determined more by local legal culture than by the
debtor herself, and most chapter 13 plans fail. A combined consumer bankruptcy
chapter would acknowledge that chapter 13 has been a sixty-five year experiment,
and the experiment didn't work out as lawmakers hoped. Whether lawmakers could
ever be persuaded to take this view is another issue, however, which suggests that a
less dramatic scheme might prove more plausible. A repayment expectation might
be added to chapter 7, for instance, without taking away the chapter 13 option.
6
One virtue of a mandatory repayment obligation for debtors who can
realistically repay some of what they owe is that it would function like an insurance
co-payment, assuring that bankruptcy debtors bore a portion of the costs of the
54 For a more'detailed discussion of the proposed reforms and the costs they would impose, see DEBT'S
DOMINION, supra note 11, at 202-10.
" For a somewhat similar proposal, see generally Michelle J. White, Why it Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A
Critical Look at Incentives Under U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law and a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L.
REv. 685 (1998). Interestingly, Warren herself argued for a single chapter approach when she served as
reporter for the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, but the proposal was attacked both by consumer
lenders and by lawyers for consumer debtors.
56 Jean Braucher and Chuck Mooney have recently offered an intriguing proposal with these features. Jean
Braucher & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Means Measurement Rather than Means Testing, 22 AM. BANKR.
INST. L.J. 6 (2003) (proposing chapter 7 debtors, with taxable incomes above set minimal levels, be required
to make bankruptcy surcharge payments for three years immediately following discharge).
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bankruptcy discharge. 57 The single chapter approach wouldn't undermine the fresh
start for debtors who are truly unable to repay, but it would ensure that those with
more significant income or income potential contributed some of the income to their
existing creditors. There are countervailing concerns, of course, such as the effect
that restrictions on the bankruptcy discharge might have on entrepreneurial activity,
but the extent of the repayment obligation could be adjusted to take these
considerations into account.58
Let me briefly suggest two other ways that we could improve the framework
bequeathed to us by the drafters of the 1978 Code. First, we should seriously
rethink the exceptions to the discharge. The existing scheme, with its
superdischarge for debtors who file for chapter 13, is essentially designed to bribe
debtors to file for chapter 13. This strikes me as an extremely confused way to
structure the choice between chapter 7 and chapter 13. 59 For many years, Vern
Countryman argued that most or all of the exceptions to the discharge should
simply be eliminated.6° In my view, Countryman was right. If the exceptions to the
discharge were eliminated, the bankruptcy court could still kick the debtor out of
bankruptcy altogether in an egregious case. But in cases where the debtor's
obligations genuinely exceeded her ability to pay, she would receive a full
discharge.
Second, assuming that chapter 7 and chapter 13 are both with us to stay, it's
always been a bit of a mystery why chapter 13 debtors do not get their discharge
until after the rehabilitation plan has been completed. Unlike in chapter 11, where
confirmation of a plan permanently alters the terms of the debtor's obligations, a
debtor who fails to complete a chapter 13 plan goes back to square one. 6' The
original obligations are reinstated (less any payments made, of course), just as if the
debtor never went through the chapter 13 process. There's no obvious reason why
the terms of the chapter 13 plan-terms that the debtor proposes and the court
approves-ought not be made permanent at the time the plan is confirmed.
These are my proposals, not Professor Warren's, however, so let me conclude
by returning to The New Economics of the American Family. As I said at the outset,
57 For a detailed analysis of the insurance effect of a bankruptcy discharge, see generally Eric A. Posner,
Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related
Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995).
's For evidence that the generosity of a state's exemptions is directly correlated with the amount of
entrepreneurial activity in the state, see Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of
Entrepreneurial Activity (Feb. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/
papers/O1/011 I.pdf).
9 See, e.g., DEBT'S DOMINION, supra note 11, at 210-11 (criticizing "moral confusion" of choice between
ch6pter 7 and chapter 13).
See, e.g., Hearings before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee
on the Judiciary on S. 235 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1038 (1975) (statement of Vem Countryman)
(noting that he would "reject the basic notion that exceptions should be carved out of the bankruptcy
discharge for the purpose of punishing disapproved conduct").
61 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2002) (providing for discharge after all payments are made). Section
1328(b) provides for a "hardship" discharge for some debtors who fail to complete their chapter 13 plan, but
only under limited circumstances. II U.S.C. § 1328(b).
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this is an extremely important article, and the book on which it is based is an
extremely important book. The "two-income trap" is a brilliant term and diagnosis
for the dilemma that millions of American families find themselves in. The term so
effectively captures this crisis in American life that I have used it ten times in these
brief comments alone. This is just the beginning. I suspect we'll be discussing,
debating and worrying about the two-income trap a lot more in the years to come.
